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Will a caveat lapse when a proceeding to establish the interest claimed 
is struck out? 
 
Section 126(4) of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) provides, in part, that if a 
caveator does not want a caveat to which the section applies to lapse, the 
caveator must start a proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction to 
establish the interest claimed under the caveat within the relevant statutorily 
prescribed time period.  However, there is no provision in the statute that 
regulates a situation where proceedings are started within time but are later 
struck out. 
Allen’s Asphalt Pty Ltd v SPM Group Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 134. 
The effect of proceedings being started within time but later being struck out 
arose for consideration by Court of Appeal in Allen’s Asphalt Pty Ltd v SPM 
Group Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 134.  In this instance, Allen’s Asphalt Pty Ltd 
(“AAPT”) lodged a caveat over SPM’s land to secure a debt alleged to be due 
under a credit agreement in which SPM had agreed to charge all their 
equitable interest in freehold or leasehold property in favour of AAPT.  
Ultimately, the debt was only $3,158.44 and related solely to legal costs.  
Within three months of lodging the caveat, AAPT filed a claim against SPM in 
the Supreme Court for a declaration that it held an interest as equitable 
chargee of the land.  AAPT did not serve the claim on SPM.  Over a year 
later, AAPT filed an application for an order that the claim filed be renewed 
which application was duly served on SPM.  SPM responded by filing an 
application, to be heard together with AAPT’s application, for orders that 
AAPT’s caveat be removed and that AAPT’s claim be struck out.  Both 
applications were heard and determined on the same day. 
The primary judge was concerned that AAPT had brought an action for such a 
small amount in the Supreme Court instead of in the Magistrates Court.  His 
Honour considered that the dispute between the parties as to whether SPM 
was liable to pay the money claimed should be determined in the Magistrates 
Court.  If successful in the Magistrates Court, AAPT could then bring its claim 
in the Supreme Court for a declaration that it had a charge over SPM’s 
property, and for orders to sell SPM’s land and use the proceeds towards 
satisfying the debt claimed.  For these reasons, the primary judge refused to 
renew AAPT’s Supreme Court claim but as the judge considered AAPT 
arguably had a caveatable interest the application to have the caveat 
removed was dismissed.  However, in his ex tempore reasons the primary 
judge did not advert to the effect of the Supreme Court proceedings being 
struck out namely that AAPT would not have “a proceeding in a court of 
competent jurisdiction to the establish the interest claimed under the caveat” 
within three months after lodgement of the caveat. 
SPM appealed contending that the primary judge erred in refusing to order the 
removal of the caveat when AAPT’s court proceedings, which it relied on to 
establish its caveatable interest, were to be struck out.  In a split decision 
(McMurdo P dissenting), the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. 
All judges agreed that s 126(4) does not state that a caveat lapses in 
circumstances where a caveat has been lodged for more than three months 
and a proceeding has been started in court of competent jurisdiction but has 
then been subsequently struck out.  However, McMurdo P (dissenting) 
opined, despite this statutory hiatus, that this must be the intended effect of 
the statutory scheme.  By contrast, the majority judges (Muir JA with the 
agreement of Daubney J) considered that such a conclusion would require, 
impermissibly, that s 126(5) of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) be read as if it 
contained before the words “the caveat lapses” the following additional words, 
or words to similar effect, “or if a proceeding commenced within the time 
required by subsection (4) is concluded for any reason and there is not extant 
any other such proceeding.” 
Further, the majority did not accept the contention that the role of the caveat 
may be subverted if a caveat could be permitted to exist in the absence of 
proceedings brought to confirm the interest claimed.  In this regard, it was 
noted that the Supreme Court had ample power under s 127 of the Land Title 
Act 1994 (Qld) to remove a caveat which ought not to remain. 
Comment 
The decision of the Court of Appeal is reflective of the delicate balance of 
judicial reasoning that can arise in circumstances of a statutory hiatus.  
Although the factual situation encountered in this instance will arise 
infrequently, legislative amendment may still be considered appropriate. 
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